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Football Players’ Migrations: a Political Stake 
Paul Dietschy ∗ 
Abstract: Based on sources from FIFA archives, Zurich, 
the article analyses footballers’ migration as a political 
stake from the interwar period to the post-colonisation 
times. Four examples are selected to study this sometimes-
neglected angle of the professional sport elite moves. The 
first one illustrates how the migration of football players fit 
in with the general policy of “race” and of national prestige 
in Fascist Italy. The second and the third example consider 
football players as sports figures representing political refu-
gees and other persons in exile; it deals with the case of the 
Basque team during the Spanish civil war and the case of 
Hungarian refugees in the first half of the fifties. The last 
example, of Mobutu’s Zaire, demonstrates that the question 
of sports migration could also serve as a revelation of 
North-South relations during the sixties. 
 
From the very start of the twentieth century, the question of football players’ 
geographical movements and their regulation constituted a major subject of 
concern for the leaders of European football federations. As the correspon-
dence exchanged between two founding fathers of the Fédération Internationale 
de Football Association (FIFA), Robert Guerin and Carl A. W. Hirschman, 
shows, it was a question of preventing “whether it be individual players or local 
clubs and associations, to play simultaneously, and in the same year, in differ-
ent national federations”.1 Thus, the intention was to maintain the national 
character of football organization and to prevent the untimely movement of 
certain “orbiting” players. Although this principle seemed to be in contradic-
tion with the cosmopolitan and transnational character of the beginnings of 
continental football,2 it was confirmed in the first statutes of FIFA, which in 
1904 expressed the will to develop matches between nations and to create a 
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European championship in the long term. The Great War reinforced this “West-
phalian order” of football. International sport, as Eric Hobsbawm remarked, 
became “an expression of national conflict, and the sportsmen representing 
their nation or their state, primarily expressions of their imagined community”.3  
However, this tendency to take the nations’ interests into account was chal-
lenged by the process of professionalisation. For professionalism was not lim-
ited to the indigenous players; it also addressed the best foreign elements, in 
particular the football players from Central Europe, who were attracted by the 
more favourable economic conditions offered in the west of the continent, first 
in Italy, then in France. Consequently the migration of professional players 
accompanied the creation of elite contests. Gradually it constituted a financial 
stake, while also taking on a political character insofar as the best footballers 
became the symbols of a nation and its “race”. 
It is thus the encounter of these two aspects of modern football, national 
identity instrumentalised by the state and the financial stakes induced by rich 
clubs, that made the migration of football players a major political issue in 
international sports relations. Because of the supposed political neutrality of the 
federal authorities, these questions were treated in an indirect way by FIFA and 
the national associations, as the shadow of the authoritative and totalitarian 
states was always there as a background to their decisions. 
Three examples allow us to study, from a sometimes neglected angle, the 
political issues involved in the migration of top-level football players. We will 
first illustrate how the migration of football players fit in with the general pol-
icy of “race” and of national prestige in Fascist Italy. Then, we will consider 
football players as sports figures representing exiles or political refugees, deal-
ing with the case of the Basque team during the Spanish civil war and the case 
of Hungarian refugees in the first half of the fifties. Lastly, we will see that the 
question of sports migration could also serve to highlight North-South relations 
during the sixties, with the example of this case study is Mobutu’s Zaire. 
Sports Immigration and “Race Policy”: 
the Case of the rimpatriati in the Period of Fascism 
Whereas it had previously provided a large number of immigrants to France 
and the two Americas, Italian emigration declined in the period between the 
two world wars. The restrictions and limitations imposed on immigration by 
certain states as well as the militia of the Fascist regime even led to the return 
of two million emigrants and migrant workers employed abroad.4 The regime 
also wanted to strengthen the bonds with the expatriate Italian communities. 
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This wish was already expressed in a law of June 13, 1912, claiming “to pre-
serve the feeling of Italianity” of the emigrants. The law established that “the 
Italian nationality, transmitted by the right of blood, [can only be lost] by a 
voluntary act” and that “the [disclaimed] Italian nationality following the spon-
taneous acquisition of a foreign nationality [was] recovered in the event of a 
return to Italy”.5 There was no question that these provisions were maintained 
under Mussolini. 
This legal framework did not only correspond to the desire of Fascism to 
promote the “Italian race”, it was also favourable to the world of football which 
was then in full expansion. The desire to forget the first World War, the force 
of the regional identities as well as the intervention of industrialists such as 
Edoardo Agnelli, son of the founder of FIAT6 – all this made football move 
towards professionalism. This turn was officially approved by the Viareggio 
Charter. This Charter prohibited the use of foreign players.7 This was a prob-
lem, as professionalism did not only involve the best transalpine players but 
also players originating from Central Europe, for example, the Hungarian Fer-
enc Hirzer who was employed by Juventus of Turin at the beginning of the 
season 1925-1926. The Viareggio Charter cut off this source of supply.8 
However, the door remained open for the rimpatriati, the descendants of 
Italian emigrants in South America who had distinguished themselves in the 
Argentinean, Uruguayan and Brazilian teams. In the South American countries, 
fútbol had been one of the most effective instruments of nation-building start-
ing from a massive and multinational immigration. Uruguay’s success at the 
Olympic Games in 1924 and 1928 as well as the virtuosity of the Argentinean 
players made it possible to create a national identity through specific national 
styles of football.9 These characteristics did not escape the attention of the 
Italian recruiters who, with the blessing of the Federazione Italiana Giuoco 
Calcio (FIGC) and the political authorities, turned to South America to seek 
stars capable of raising the crude technical level of players at home. On the 
whole more than 118 Italian descendants arrived in Italy from 1929 to 1943 to 
make their talent pay in the motherland’s series A and B clubs.10 The most 
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gifted of them became stars whose aura was quite comparable to the native 
players: the Argentinean Raimundo Orsi by becoming the best paid football 
player in Italy,11 his compatriot Cesarini by his speciality of scoring in the last 
minutes of a match (which still remains the zona Cesarini in the male culture 
and memory of the peninsula). In this manner, the rimpatriati contributed their 
share to the construction of the consensus in Italy in the first half of the thirties 
as identified by the historian Renzo De Felice. Although their exploits and life 
styles did not always comply with the norms of the Fascist order,12 they gave 
substance to the single pool championship first played during the 1929-1930 
season. Appearing at the wheel of their car or on the Tyrrhenian coast in Il 
Calcio illustrato magazine, against the backdrop of the futurist architecture 
stadiums such as the Berta in Florence or the Mussolini in Turin, they embod-
ied the “Taylorization of leisure” as described by Victoria De Grazia: a mass 
entertainment and the transmission of pictures of modernity via a modernized 
press and the celebration of the body.13 
Beyond a more or less disguised propaganda in the sports press that served 
the purpose of institutions such as the Fascist leisure organisation Opera Nazi-
onale Dopolavoro, the best South American players also played an essential 
role in the world title won by the squadra azzurra in 1934. In front of the Duce 
in person Orsi scored one of the two goals of the victory against Czechoslova-
kia, whereas another Italian from Argentina, Monti, did the “housework” in the 
middle of the field. However, the welcome offered to these rimpatriati in-
volved some contradictions. Had the press not pointed to Raimundo Orsi pledg-
ing his allegiance to Italianity in Spanish, when he arrived in Genoa in October 
1928, and by affirming that he was very happy to have returned to the mother-
land, although he was “rather popular in Argentina”?14 
More serious than these incidents the Ethiopian war was a test of the patri-
otic feelings of the players coming from the southern hemisphere. Orsi, for 
example, returned to Argentina in April 1935, after having asked for the ap-
proval of the club and the FIGC, which made it possible to affirm that it was 
not “about a rather unfortunate defection [at] this moment”.15 But other young 
Italians from South America, among them Scopelli, Stagnaro and Guaita who 
were in the age to march on Addis-Abeba, “had left Italy and broken their 
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contracts”.16 Stopped at the border in order to hand over their convocation for a 
military medical visit,17 they thus illustrated the limits of a sports immigration 
policy in which the lure of profit was vastly more important than the feeling of 
membership of the Italian nation or adhesion to the values of Fascism.  
However, in spite of these annoying desertions, the goal was reached: the 
level of Italian football progressed considerably and in June 1938 Italy won a 
second world title in Paris, on the playing field of a democratic nation consid-
ered to be in decline and a soon-to-be enemy – thanks to a team primarily made 
up of native players. It was a victory for both Fascism and the “razza”. 
From no passaran to I chose liberty: 
Football Exiles and Refugees 
The Case of Spain 
The period between the two world wars also saw the development of football in 
another large Latin country: Spain. From June 1924, professional football was 
legalised18 and the “people’s game” entered the age of crowds. Actually, the 
Spanish team was considered to be one of the most respected sides in Europe 
and included one of the stars of world football: the goalkeeper Ricardo Zamora. 
It was thus a thriving show firmly implanted in urban mass culture that was 
politicised and radicalised by the military rising of July.  
As of August 8, 1936, the Spanish Federation of fútbol was purged and 
henceforth directed by people “unconditionally faithful to the established rule 
and to the policies of the frente popular”.19 In opposition to this republican 
football, the nationalists created the Real Federación Nacional de España20 in 
the conquered territories on October 17, 1937. From then on football became a 
propaganda tool with a double dimension, internal and external, as was the case 
of the civil war itself. Firstly, even though the majority of the large clubs, ex-
cept the FC Barcelona, joined the pro-Franco camp, the Basque teams, at least 
before the surrender in the summer of 1937, remained faithful to the republican 
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cause.21 Secondly, the government and the Basque football federation organ-
ized a propaganda tour by a “representative team” in Western Europe in April 
1937.22  
After having played matches in Czechoslovakia and France, the Basque 
players left for Latin America in order to continue their tour. Consequently, 
their position changed: from that of travelling football players supporting a 
noble cause, they became exiled, stateless people whom the pro-Franco federa-
tion tried to make return. They were exiled, as their homeland had been occu-
pied by the nationalist troops during the summer and was subjected to a harsh 
repression.23 They were stateless, at least at the sports level, under the terms of 
a decision taken by the Executive Committee of FIFA to prohibit “all meetings 
with the Spanish teams until further notice”.24 Facing this new but characteris-
tic case of the “century of the refugees”,25 the world football federation had to 
face the rigour of its rules while following the narrow path of political neutral-
ity in sports. “Prompted by a feeling of humanity and benevolence towards this 
team and to allow it to find the means of returning to Europe”, it first granted 
the authorization “to play four matches [in] Mexico”.26 Then in September 
1938, confronted with the determination of the Basque players not to return to 
Spain, FIFA’s Urgency Committee lifted the injunction of the players “under 
the condition that these players submit their adherence to a FIFA association 
within four weeks”.27 Finally, only two of about thirty players returned to their 
country.28 Mexican and Argentinean teams enrolled the others. Some of them 
became stars of national championships while being at the same time political 
refugees and economic immigrants. 
The Case of Hungary 
While the Basque players fled Spain, some famous Hungarian football players 
moved in the opposite direction. Like Spain, Hungary was a big football nation. 
In the period between the world wars, football was a means of consolidating 
the national identity of a country that had lost a about one third of its territory 
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and faced serious economic and social difficulties. There was even a new Hun-
garian national style in football: artistic and fierce; it was supposed to express 
“Magyarity”.29 This heritage was not lost in the period of the Stalinist regime of 
Mátyás Rákosi (1948-1953). In 1952, the Hungarian national team won Olym-
pic gold in Helsinki, then inflicted two searing defeats on the English football 
champions,30 before only just missing the world title in 1954. 
As a consequence, the migrations of Hungarian footballers had strong media 
and political repercussions in these times of East-West tension. These depar-
tures towards the “imperialistic camp”, to use a Jdanovienian expression, 
started and came to light by the Kubala affair. In January 1949, Laszlo Kubala, 
one of the best players of the Budapest Vasas crossed the border to take refuge 
in Austria’s American occupation zone. After a journey through Italy he ar-
rived in Spain where FC Barcelona immediately enrolled him, before being 
naturalized and wearing the shirt of the Spanish national team. Disqualified for 
life by his original federation but defended against the international rules by the 
Iberian association, Kubala became the symbol of the abuse of authority for 
one side, of freedom for the other. In order to prevent the defector from playing 
on the pro-Franco fields, the Hungarian authorities did not hesitate to bring him 
to court for fraud, whereas his old club denounced his amoral and anti-social 
character to the FIFA. Thus, he had lived “an unsportive life, with depraved 
habits” and left his country, his club and his parents, “without any work or 
material support”.31 
Obviously, the pro-Franco sports authorities were not of the same opinion. 
For the Spanish federation, the case of Kubala was primarily political and was 
an example, along with so many others, of communist oppression. The player 
had chosen to escape to the “free world” in order to escape an “imminent threat 
of death”.32 All things considered, to let Kubala play was equivalent to respect-
ing “human rights”. Although there cannot be any doubt about Kubala’s wish 
to escape from “the terrifying dictatorship of the Communist Party”,33 the two 
opposing camps avoided a fundamental question. Indeed, as FIFA president 
Jules Rimet expressed it: “Nobody has put forth the assumption that Kubala, a 
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player of recognized quality, simply left his country to gain advantages of a 
material nature that he was sure of obtaining abroad”.34 In other words, the 
figure of the footballer-refugee was much more complex than the “verbiage 
which [was] a part of the style of autocratic regimes, whether they [were] 
communist or fascist”.35 If the call for freedom seemed authentic, there was 
also the desire of elite professional players who were increasingly sought after, 
to take advantage of the high wages paid in the championships in Spain or 
Italy. 
Consequently, the Kubala case was regarded as characteristic of a state of 
mind that one found again when, under dramatic circumstances in 1956, 240 
Hungarian players36 from the first and second divisions fled their country fol-
lowing the crushing of the Budapest insurrection by the Red Army. On that 
occasion, the entire Honved team defected and its best players such as Puskas, 
Czibor and Kocsis went to fill the ranks of the major Spanish clubs. The bitter-
ness of exile was thus partly cushioned by the material and sporting successes 
made possible by Santiago Bernabéu, the President of Real Madrid, and others. 
The Case of Zaire 
Although sporting excellence as regards the most popular ball game remained 
the prerogative of the European and South American continents, the talents of 
the African football players started to awaken the curiosity of professional 
clubs from the 1950s. Football had been introduced to Africa just before the 
First World War. From the thirties, France, a pioneering country in this matter, 
integrated players from its colonies in its best teams, even in its national team.37 
However, it is only after the Second World War, that the European champion-
ship began to act as an incentive to woo away significant numbers of African 
players who sometimes became, as in the case of Rachid Mekloufi,38 the stars 
of these matches. 
Belgium, because of its bonds with Congo, did not escape this phenomenon. 
Introduced by the colonists to Léopoldville and Elisabethville about 1912, the 
practice of football was soon controlled by the Association Royale Sportive 
Congolaise (ARSC) founded in 1919 by the “Very Reverend Father” Raphaël 
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de la Kethulle de Ryhove. The game was thus integrated in the Belgian project 
of colonization, as these words written in 1945 testify: “To colonize, is to civi-
lize. The school of sport is also a part of civilization such as we understand 
it”.39 However, hidden behind this colonial paternalism there was a less happy 
reality, closer to the pitiless exploitation in place since the time of Léopold II. 
Actually, as of the fifties, certain Congolese players started to attract the atten-
tion of European recruiters, in particular the Portuguese from Angola. The 
negotiations over their transfers made it possible to lift the veil on the sporting 
practices of the colonizers. Thus, when the Congolese player Mokuna accepted 
an offer of transfer by Sporting Lisbon, the ARSC initially vetoed it.  
The ARSC claimed a compensation for the departure of the player40 al-
though, as some native players explained to Jules Rimet, the Congolese foot-
ballers were neither paid, nor even insured, so that playing accidents had dra-
matic consequences for local sportsmen. Consequently, the plaintiffs 
concluded: “But we see that the rules don’t care about our fate, maybe it is 
because we are black. But we believe that we also have several of our brothers 
of colour in France, America etc… and who are not subject to the same treat-
ment as us”. Even if a nihil obstat was finally granted to Makuna, football thus 
appeared to apply the same iron law of wages as the Belgian colonial economy, 
marked by the hounding of the native labour in the period between the wars or, 
later, the exploitation of the black proletariat by the mining companies.41 It is 
therefore not a surprise that the emigration of players, to Belgium this time, 
became a particularly thorny question once independence had been acquired, in 
particular under “Marshal” Mobutu. 
As in the majority of the African countries, a “real mystique of football”42 
contributed to ensure a hypothetical national cohesion, while at the same time 
being used as an instrument of regional assertion.43 It also took an aggressive 
turn with regard to the old colonial power. Indeed, from then on the Belgian 
clubs drew largely on the Congolese breeding ground to recruit cheap players. 
As the elite of the national sport was at stake the transfers became a political 
question, and from 1966, the departure of Congolese players was subject to a 
prior authorization by the “Haut Commissariat à la Jeunesse et aux Sports du 
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Gouvernement Central”.44 Thus, “Congo [expected] to make sure that the pos-
sible expatriation of its citizens did not harm the higher interests of the coun-
try”. Until the beginning of the seventies, the relations between the Belgian and 
the Congolese federations were strained by disagreements about transfers. On 
one side, the Belgian clubs sought to attract the best Congolese at bargain rates, 
on the other, the sporting authorities of the future Zaire repatriated the national 
players operating in “the flat country”, by transforming the temporary convoca-
tion for a selection to the national team into a definite return, without the pay-
ment of any indemnity. In a way the policy of nationalization of the players 
preceded the “Zaïrianisation” of foreign companies in 1973.45 Thus, in a dema-
gogic way and without any respect for personal freedom, the Mobutu regime, 
by the intermediary of a nationalized federation, took care to protect the na-
tional wealth by placing football players, copper and diamonds on the same 
level. This was commentated by FIFA general secretary Helmut Käser as fol-
lows: “I do hope that the Fédération Congolaise de Football will realize that it 
is necessary to distinguish between the membership of a sports federation and 
the rights of a citizen of any given country”.46 
This protectionist policy finally culminated in December 1973. The “leop-
ards”, as the Zairean national team was nicknamed, succeeded in getting the 
single place reserved for Africa in the final contest of the World Cup played in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, a performance qualified as a “day of glory 
for the Republic of Zaire”.47 However, they were eliminated without glory in 
the first round, beaten by nine goals in the game against Yugoslavia. The sports 
“Mobutism” thus showed its limits while at the same time the regime started to 
be destabilized by recurring political and economic crises. The monitoring of 
the players then became a secondary issue but the intransigence of the Congo-
lese federation had created a new interest in African players by especially Bel-
gian and French recruiters.48 If the word “trade” is a little strong to qualify 
these migratory movements, the profits certain intermediaries and European 
clubs made by the resale of players imported at low cost strongly remind us of 
the foundations of the colonial economies. 
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Conclusion 
Tackling the question of professional players’ migrations thus appears to be a 
valid approach to judge the political dimension of football. Through its mobi-
lising and representative function, the most popular ballgame in the world has 
been a showcase for nationalism and ideological conflict. In Fascist Italy the 
use of rimpatriati was a part of a policy to re-integrate the overseas Italians and 
to introduce gradually even autarky. In the same vein the South American stars 
were used by the propaganda to vaunt the virtues of the “Italian race” re-
awoken by the Fascists. This was the contradiction of a sport that appears to be 
heavily marked by ideology although in reality it follows the logics of profes-
sionalism. To some extent the same can be said for the Hungarian and Spanish 
cases. Even though the Basque players defended the colours of the Euskadi, 
they nevertheless had to make a living in a situation where the chances of mak-
ing a career in Spain were low due to the civil war. The same is true for Kubala 
whose decision to migrate was just as motivated by the wish to see his talent 
fully paid for in the Spanish championship as by the wish to escape the rigid 
control of Rákosi’s totalitarian regime. Even though the context is different, the 
case of Mobutu’s Congo shows the intensive politicisation of African football 
just after Independence. Football players were regarded as a foundation of 
nation and national wealth. They were an instrument of revenge against the old 
colonizer as well as part of the task of holding together the new nation state 
torn apart by conflicting ethnic groups. 
Nowadays, the opening of the sports borders and the commercialisation of 
football that has occurred since its absorption by the “global village” do indeed 
make these protectionist sports policies outmoded. However, even if today the 
identity of football players is more defined by the clubs and the international 
brands that support them, the matches involving national teams still allow 
exiled sportsmen to be, for the duration of a World Cup, the heralds of a new 
type of nationalism inherited from the European model of the nation state. 
